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The European Union Data Privacy
Directive and International Relations
Steven R. Salbu*
ABSTRACT

This Article explores the European Union Data Privacy
Directive and its impact upon internationalrelations. Part II
provides a background upon which the Privacy Directive is
built. In Part III, the Article confronts the differences between
how the United States and its European counterparts address
privacy issues generally. Part IV analyzes the Privacy Directive
in detail, while Part V explores possible effects that the Privacy
Directive might have on internationalrelations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the European Union passed the Data Privacy Directive
(Directive), under which Member States are required to enact
The Directive is the world's most
implementing legislation. 1
ambitious and far-reaching data privacy initiative of the highIts global pervasiveness, and therefore its
technology era.
extraterritorial effects, raise interesting questions regarding tension
between the goal of uniform Internet policies and the importance of
respecting sovereignty and national autonomy. The resolution of this
tension may ultimately affect international relations in the new
century.
This Article examines these dynamics. Part II is a primer on
contemporary data privacy issues, the foundation upon which the EU
Directive is built. Part III briefly discusses differences between U.S.
and European approaches to these privacy issues, highlighting a
present lack of global uniformity, even among two Western,
developed, regional economies. Part IV analyzes the EU Directive
and includes some critical observations, highlighting potential pitfalls
and shortcomings. Part V looks at the relationship between the EU
approach and international relations, examining possible effects on
the furtherance or hindrance of a harmonious and cohesive world
community.

1.
Data Privacy Directive, Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
[hereinafter EU Directive].
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II. A

PRIMER ON CONTEMPORARY DATA PRIVACY ISSUES

2
Privacy is a concern that obviously predates modern technology.
It is also easily taken for granted. As one scholar observes, privacy is
a lot like freedom: people do not appreciate its value and importance
until it is threatened or lost.3 In an era of burgeoning information
technology, privacy also 'can become an afterthought, a secondary
consideration in the race to find and exploit the next cutting-edge
4
development.
Since the 1980s, but prior to public diffusion of developing
Internet technology, legal scholars recognized how seriously
computers can threaten privacy. 5 The advantages of technology come
at a price: one person's "enhanced information" can invade another
naturally creates conflict,
person's privacy. 6 This double-edged sword
7
based on both self-interest and ideology.
Reasons for concern have escalated, and they continue to grow.
Privacy is becoming increasingly susceptible to ever more
sophisticated technologies. Electronic identification cards, wiretaps,
biometrics, and video surveillance cameras all have the potential to
erode privacy.8 Digital interactive television technology soon may tell
advertisers exactly which programs people view in their homes,

Andrew J. Frackman & Rebecca C. Martin, Surfing the Wave of On-Line
2.
Privacy Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 14, 2000, at 5 (observing that privacy concerns and
fears of government and corporate collection of data pre-date the Internet).

3.

David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and

Data Protection,41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831, 831 (1991).

4.

Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.

REV. 1193, 1286 (1998) (noting that privacy issues were historically afterthoughts, and
that as technology drives people to continue making rapid advances, they react only
"after the fact" to technology's social consequences).

5.

See, e.g., Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial

Disseminationof PersonalInformation, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1997) (recognizing that
computer technology creates threats to privacy that were unimaginable shortly before
the technology's development, and discussing these threats in detail).
6.
See, e.g., Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Survey, Privacy Please: Will the

Internet Industry Act to Protect Consumer Privacy Before the Government Steps In?, 54
Bus. LAW. 349, 351-52 (1998) (observing that the Internet's great promise is
accompanied by great risk in the form of potential privacy invasions).
The conflict of self-interest is as follows: companies marketing their own
7.
products or the products of others have reason to be wary of losing the capabilities
created by Internet technology to legal or regulatory constraints. On the other hand,
many data subjects will be interested in constraining marketing efforts in order to
protect their personal privacy. For a discussion of the conflicting ideologies, see infra
notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
8.
Domingo R. Tan, Comment, Personal Privacy in the Information Age:

Comparison of Internet Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the
European Union, 21 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (1999).

658

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:655

refining target advertising 9 in ways that are potentially both
beneficial and frightening. 10
No modern technology poses a greater threat to privacy than the
Internet. 1
Interactive computer technology allows researchers to
collect data more cheaply and efficiently. 12 Conversion of data into
binary form enables the common person to store, use, and misuse
data in powerful new ways.13 Computer technology also allows
commercial and other entities 14 to accomplish data collection tasks
more quickly and inexpensively. 15 What once took days of manual
labor now can be accomplished with a keystroke; what once required
substantial capital now can be achieved by anyone with a computer
16
and a modem.
By the late 1990s, the potential had become a reality, as a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) survey analyzed 1402 websites and
concluded that ninety-two percent collected personal data, and that
17
the majority did so without posting privacy disclosure statements.

9.
Tom Foremski, Digital Interactive Television, FIN. TIMES, July 5, 2000, at
11 (describing new technologies being pursued by companies such as Microsoft,
DirectTV, and AOL, through which the fusion of television and computers will enable
two-way communications between programmers and viewers).
10.
For discussion of the latest developments in this area, see Shelley Emling,
Digital Opens Up Future of Cable TV- Technology Adds Money-Making Options for
Companies, Services for Customers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 28, 2001, at Al. The
potential benefit to consumers is improvement in the utility of the advertising viewed.
Id. While some may see this as a positive change, it may be frightening to others who
dislike becoming increasingly vulnerable to what they see as marketing and
advertising wiles. Id. Moreover, the very notion that programmers and advertisers are
collecting information about consumers as they watch television is disturbing. Id.
11.
Marilynn Larkin, Web privacy worries won't go away, LANCET, April 22,
2000, at 1471, available at 2000 WL 9005462 (observing that, in the United States,
Internet privacy breaches are reported in the news daily).
12.
Edmund Sanders, For Sale: Your Personal Data-Cheap,Easy, OnLine,
L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2000, at Al (observing that personal information is increasingly
available to everyone, not just to specialty marketers and brokers able to pay steep
prices).
13.
Michael W. Heydrich, Note, A Brave New World: Complying with the
European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Through the Power of Contract, 25
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 407, 408-09 (1999) (noting that "[w]ith the capacity to convert data
into binary form, the ability to store and use personal data has increased significantly,
thus making the individual's personal information more susceptible to misuse.").
14.
The threat to privacy is posed not only by commercial firms, but also by
other entities and organizations.
Government agencies are an obvious example.
Recently, the FBI has come under scrutiny and criticism for the data surveillance
system that it, perhaps imprudently, called "Carnivore."
FBI surveillance via
Carnivore has raised search and seizure concerns, in addition to more generic privacy
concerns. See generally Jon Baumgarten et al., FBI's E-Mail 'Wiretap" Under Scrutiny,
5 CYBERSPACE LAW. 28 (2000).
15.
Sanders, supra note 12.
16.
Id.
17.
Karl D. Belgum, Who Leads at Half-Time?: Three Conflicting Visions of
Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1,
11 (1999), at http://www.
richmond.edu/jolt/v6il/belgum.html (citing Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online:
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as "filled
More anecdotally, Professor Sovern describes modern media
18
information."'
personal
of
use
the
about
stories
horror
with
Lack of disclosure is a serious problem. Internet-enhanced
invasion of privacy can be especially insidious because the technology
facilitates the collection of personal data without the knowledge of the
subject. 19 Among the more disturbing concerns is the collection of
identifying information, such as address, social security number,
medical information, financial information, and credit card
20
information.
Some critics of the non-consensual flow of personal information
posit property arguments in support of the electronic privacy
movement. 21 They contend that the subjects of personal information
have the right to control its use, including the right to sell it.2 2 Some
property-based discussions appear to be based on conceptions of
fairness. 23 Others have focused on the purported externalities
pertaining to uncompensated use of private data. 24 Still others have
discussed property-related policy approaches to privacy issues, such
as the possibility of licensing private information. 25 In a world where

A Report to Congress, June 1998, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy3/toc.htm).
Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for
18.
Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1999) (detailing
examples of the amounts and varieties of information that can be accessed
inexpensively by anyone, including a reporter identifying himself with the name of a
man on trial for kidnapping and murder).
Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
19.
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505 (1999) (observing that data collection in
cyberspace is invisible-i.e., occurs without the knowledge of the person about whom
data is being collected).
Eric J. Sinrod & Barak D. Jolish, Controlling Chaos: The Emerging Law of
20.
Privacy and Speech in Cyberspace, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4.
Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization,and Gender, 34
21.
U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 687 (2000).
Bartow observes, "[I]f information about us is to be bought and sold, the initial
22.
purchase should be from us, since we are the ultimate content providers. If intangible
property rights are rewards for the effort expended in creating the thing to be
protected, we are entitled to ownership of our personal information." Id. at 687.
39-40 (arguing that "[p]rivacy market
Belgum, supra note 17,
23.
opportunists begin with the assumption that, even though privacy may be a
'fundamental human right,' that does not mean that individuals should not have the
ability to decide for themselves how much that right is worth to them personally, and
whether to sell, trade or give away their private information in their own selfinterest.").
Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH.
24.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 103 (2001) (noting that "websites benefited through
the largely unrestricted collection of personal data while consumers suffered injury due
to the degradation of their personal privacy from this data collection. In other words,
degradation of consumer privacy resulted as a third-party externality of free-market
data-collection norms of the website industry.").
See generally Kalinda Basho, Comment, The Licensing of Our Personal
25.
Information: Is it a Solution to Internet Privacy?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507 (2000).
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companies pay or otherwise compensate consumers for personal
information with increasing frequency, 26 expectations regarding
information rights are likely to shift.

The property rights approach is appealing because it both
recognizes and accommodates different preferences and priorities
among consumers. Under this approach, those consumers who value
their privacy highly need not sell the rights to personal data and
information; those who place a lower value on privacy are free to sell
27
their data and information.
There are also good arguments in favor of maintaining the freest
possible flow of information, including personal information. Society
benefits from increased access to information. 2 8 Some commentators
suggest that the free collection and use of information benefits not
only businesses, but also consumers and society at large, 29 and that
current pro-privacy trends may therefore more accurately be
classified as "privacy panic. ''30 Consumers ostensibly benefit by
receiving more pertinent information, as companies better target
their advertising to personal interests; 3' society ostensibly benefits as
better, more efficient marketing supports e-commerce and a thriving

economy. 32 In addition, all users benefit from free Internet services
that are sponsored by advertisers. If Internet advertising fails to be
effective, advertiser sponsorship will decline and the public could lose

26.
Eric J. Sinrod et al., The New Wave of Speech and Privacy Developments in
Cyberspace, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 583, 592 (1999) (discussing programs in
which online marketers provide free personal computers to consumers in exchange for
monitoring rights and demographic data).
27.
Eve M. Caudill & Patrick E. Murphy, Consumer Online Privacy: Legal and
Ethical Issues, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 7, 8 (2000). "A continuum suggests that
consumers have varying degrees of concern with privacy and place different values on
their personal information; therefore, some consumers may be willing to trade away
information for a more valued incentive." Id.
28.
Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 350 (recognizing the Internet's potential to
serve society as "the next commercial marketplace").
James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe
29.
Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145, 150
(2001). "[T]he open flow of information not only comports with the U.S. system of selfgovernance, it also assists in promoting commerce, and providing citizens with
significant economic and social benefits." Id.
30.
Pamela Paul, What Are Americans Afraid Of? Mixed Signals; When It
Comes to Issues of Privacy, Consumers are Fraught with Contradictions, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, July 2001, at 46.
31.
Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Private or Not?; Behind the Scenes, Web Site
OperatorsAre GatheringInformation on their Visitors, A Practice that Treads the Line
Between Customer Service and Invasion of Privacy, WASH. POST, May 17, 2000, at G22
(comparing e-commerce profiling with business's historic use of memory to serve
customers by knowing their personal preferences).
Wendy Muller, The High Cost of Net Privacy, STRATEGY, May 8, 2000, at 20
32.
(providing social and economic reasons why a free Internet needs to protect business's
ability to deliver effective advertisements).

20021

EU PRIVACY DIRECTIVE

Any means of improving advertising
many useful sites.3 3
effectiveness is also a means of supporting a robust web of services,
34
available without charge.
Skeptics counter that, unless people are careful, the benefits will
come at a serious cost to personal privacy. 35 The threat comes from
the government as well as the private sector. 36 Although technology
37
can be used to circumvent the privacy of consumer information,
38
Companies can
policies can be established to protect these rights.
use,
or distribute
collect,
to
their
intent
be required to notify people of
39
with
consumers
as well as to provide
personal information,
processes
meaningful control over whether-and if so, how-these
occur.
Specifically, both opt-in and opt-out policies provide a measure of
consumer privacy protection, although the former are stronger than
the latter.40 Opt-in policies prohibit businesses from collecting, using,
or sharing 4 ' personal information unless the subject of that

Id.
33.
34.
O'Harrow, supra note 31 (quoting DoubleClick's director of public policy,
Josh Isay, who noted that "[i]n order to keep the Internet free, Web sites need to be
profitable. And in order to be profitable, they need targeted ads that work."').
Robert L. Hoegle & Christopher P. Boam, Putting a premium on privacy
35.
protection policies, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 2000, at C8 (citing consumers' and regulators'
concerns about potential misuse of customer information).
Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the
36.
European Data Directive on U.S. Businesses, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 275, 278
(1998) (noting that the federal government began collecting substantial personal
information by the beginning of the 1970s).
This emphasis on consumers' "own information" raises questions regarding
37.
whether consumer information can be owned, and if so, how property interests in
consumer information are to be determined. For one sample discussion of information
ownership, see John Caher, Privacy Initiative Aims for Consumer Protection, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 24, 2000, at 1 (quoting New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who stated that
'[elverybody-on the left politically, in the middle politically, on the right politicallyhas come to an understanding that with technological changes, the capacity of an
individual to maintain ownership of information about himself or herself is being
diminished in a very significant way."').
38.
Jonathan Cox, Senate, House Plan to Address Net Privacy, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 12, 2001, at 54 (noting companies are creating policies and practices to ensure
privacy protections for users of the Internet).
39.
"Personal information" usually refers to information that can be associated
with a particular individual-i.e., information that is tied with a person's namerather than to information that would be considered highly confidential. This means
that information that might be obvious, such as gender, would be considered personal,
and that information not ordinarily considered sensitive is also included.
Stephen R. Bergerson, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: E40.
Commerce Privacy and the Black Hole of Cyberspace, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1527,
1554-55 (2001) (explaining that while opt-in policies provide stronger protection to
consumers, they do come with potential disadvantages, including costliness and
impracticality for businesses).
Opt-in policies and opt-in legal requirements can be fashioned to prohibit
41.
any or all of these activities. A weaker opt-in policy or law might prohibit only sharing
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information has expressly agreed to these activities. 42 Under an optin policy, the default assumption is that every consumer expects
privacy. 43 The assumption can be rebutted only through voluntary

and affirmative

consumer consent.

Opt-out policies prohibit

businesses from collecting, using, or sharing 44 personal information
only after a consumer has taken the initiative to inform the
45
appropriate person or entity of objections to the relevant activities.
In contrast to opt-in policies, the default assumption in opt-out
policies is that a given consumer does not have privacy expectations
regarding relevant activities, such as collecting, using, or sharing the
data. 46 To trigger the privacy protections that are automatic under
an opt-in policy, a consumer must take the initiative and follow the
47
prescribed steps.
In many instances, companies collecting data do not
conspicuously inform individuals of their opt-out rights or provide
them with instructions and contact information for exercising their
rights. 48 In these cases, the consumer must be willing to investigate
the procedure and the details of implementation in order to exercise
their rights. It is likely that these dynamics impede the assertion of
opt-out privileges in many cases. While consumers most concerned
with privacy are more likely to go to the trouble, those who are
moderately concerned are less likely to expend the resources
necessary to exercise their opt-out rights. Even among consumers

prior to opt-in, whereas a stronger opt-in policy might prohibit all the enumerated
activities.
42.
Keith Rodgers, Telecoms Media Technology: Out of the Valley-The Battle
Is On For Consumer Privacy, INDEP. (London), Sept. 2, 2001, at 8 (describing opt-in
policies as placing the onus on companies to get consumers' authorization before
sharing data).
43.
Scott Kiltingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in
Principle and Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 69 (1999) (observing that opt-in
policies provide greater protection than opt-out policies because opt-in policies adopt
non-use and non-disclosure as default assumptions).
44.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45.
Allen E. Cooper, Privacy Policies: Financial Information Shouldn't Be
Shared, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 16, 2001, at 12A (noting that "[pleople have
been receiving customer privacy notices from the financial companies they deal with,
and the notices state that customers must notify the companies if they do not want
their personal information shared with other companies.").
46.
Lawrence Jenab, Comment, Will the Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of
Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th Congress, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 641, 667-68 (2001) (discussing opt-in and opt-out policies in terms of the default
rules that they apply).
47.
Mike Hatch, The Privatizationof Big Brother. ProtectingSensitive Personal
Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1457, 1497 (2001). "The amount of time, inconvenience, and cost of exercising an optout right is substantial." Id.
48.
See id. at 1496-97 (explaining that many U.S. consumers are unaware of
their opt-out rights, and that there are few incentives for companies to provide
conspicuous notice of rights or other forms of opt-out related disclosure).
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with high privacy-concern levels, some will be too busy or distracted
to pursue an interest that they consider very important.
Some commercial interests and opponents of privacy advocates
counter that opt-in and other aggressive policies add unnecessary or
even prohibitive costs to doing business. 49 Anti-regulation arguments
are bolstered by data suggesting that theoretical privacy concerns
may not be very important to real consumers. For example, when
New York Telephone enabled customers to opt out of a mailing list it
intended to share with direct marketers, only 800,000 of 6.3 million
50
customers exercised the option.
Of course, privacy advocates can challenge the significance of
this information on at least four grounds. First, 800,000 is a large
number in absolute terms, and even as a proportion it is not a trivial
percentage of offerees. Second, some of those who did not opt out in
this case might do so in another case. For example, they might have
considered the particular terms of the marketing practices proposed
by New York Telephone to be either personally desirable or
innocuous, yet would opt out under other circumstances. Third, the
distribution of opt-out decisions may be a poor proxy for whether
consumers consider the choice itself to be important. One may decide
in a particular case not to opt out, but still view the right to make the
decision as fundamental. Finally, privacy rights cannot be measured
strictly quantitatively. A minority can consider their privacy to be a
very precious thing. The possibility that some do not share the
concerns of the minority should not detract from the legitimacy of
that concern.
In short there are privacy advocates and there are opponents of
privacy advocates-not surprising, given the tradeoffs between use of
information and abuse of information. Privacy advocates emphasize
the price of information-sharing; opponents emphasize the benefits of
information sharing.
The "benefit-at-a-price" model of information processing applies
to many of Internet innovations. For example, on-line medical data
can be an enormous boon to individuals, who now can provide doctors
around the world with instant access to their medical histories in the
Globe-traveling patients also can
event of an emergency. 51
communicate quickly and inexpensively with their own doctors via e-

49.
Dale E. Ramsey, Letter to the Editor, KAN. CITY STAR, July 22, 2001
(writing that "[wihen Congress attempted to deal with privacy and financial
institutions, the 'opt-in' approach-where individuals would initiate giving permission
for use of their private information-was discarded under pressure from business. The
argument? Too costly for business.").
50.

ANNE W. BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? 15 (1994).

51.
Jane E. Allen, ER Doctors Often Face a Shortage-of Patient Info, L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 2000, at S1 (noting the ability of information systems to improve
emergency health care by giving providers important treatment information regarding
the patients they serve).
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mail.52 In the words of the M.D. Anderson Center's Chief Information
Officer, "The Internet will fundamentally transform the way we
'5 3
conduct health care in this country and the world.

When on-line personal medical information gets into the wrong
hands, however, the intended beneficiary of data processing can
54
become a casualty, as in employment or insurance discrimination.
On-line financial data bear similar benefits and risks, as desirable
facilitation of financial transactions is countered by possible
undesirable flow of information to unauthorized recipients. 55
The down-side of the information revolution is troublesome both
in its own right and because of its broader implications. Potential
privacy violations are obviously disturbing in both their intrusiveness
and their ability to harm individuals. 56 Moreover, the prospect of
privacy violations can have negative economic effects, impeding the
development of e-commerce if consumer mistrust undermines
57
adoption of the Internet for commercial transactions.
58
Like many other policy challenges posed by the Internet,
today's privacy concerns were not as compelling a decade ago, because
the technology is so new and powerful, and is changing so quickly. 59
More than ever, the speed of innovation and attendant social
change 60 deprives lawmakers and regulators around the world of time

52.
For a discussion of this phenomenon and the privacy challenges it poses,
see Allisa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-PatientCommunication by
Electronic Mail, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267 (1999).
53.
Laura Goldberg, Doctors, hospitals find multiple uses for e-Information,
HOUSTON CHRON., May 21, 2000, at 38, available at 2000 WL 4301089 (quoting
Mitchell Morris, chief information officer at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center).
54.
Allen, supra note 51, at Si. "High-tech solutions that link personal medical
histories to the Internet or scannable cards that reveal sensitive data could
compromise careers or insurance if the information fell into the wrong hands." Id.
55.
Peter P. Swire, FinancialPrivacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 481 (1999) (noting, in the context of government
surveillance, the possibility that financial data may flow to "unauthorized third
parties").
56.
See generally CAI Elec. Comm. Advisory Council, Protecting One's Privacy,
E-COMMERCE REP., at http://www.e-commerce.ca.gov/le_privacy.html (discussing an
array of consumer privacy interests in the context of the Internet).
57.
Chris Tolhurst, Big Brother Fears Fuel Net Reluctance, AUSTRALIAN FIN.
REV., Sept. 20, 1999, at 40, available at 1999 WL 19339664 (calling privacy-related
consumer mistrust the greatest drawback for e-commerce businesses).
58.
Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2000) (observing that the idea of Internet regulation in
general began only in the 1990s, once the technology began to serve as a society-wide
medium for communications).
59.
Editorial, Construct Politics with an Eye to the Future, DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo), Jan. 10, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 3965175. "The nation and its people
are confronted by a host of great changes due to the accelerated pace of globalization,
rapid progress in the information technology revolution and the development of new
technologies." Id.
60.
Julia M. Fromholz, The European Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 461, 461 (2000) (tying growing concern about protection of personal data to
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for careful, deliberate consideration of the implications of new
technology and the best ways to address those implications. This
pressure is exacerbated by the international character of globespanning technologies, which increase the number of stakeholders as
well as the complexity of policy-making. 61 Despite these sub-optimal
conditions for creating rules of the game, the modern proliferation of
the media, largely fueled by Internet technology, heightens the
pressures placed on lawmakers to respond, perhaps more quickly
62
than ever before.
No one has responded more quickly or more vigorously to modern
privacy challenges than the European Union. The section that
follows describes the philosophical differences between the European
and U.S. approaches to contemporary privacy challenges.
III. EUROPEAN VERSUS U.S. PHILOSOPHIES AND APPROACHES TO
PRIVACY
Protection of personal data is an issue throughout the world, and
all nations face similar challenges to some degree. The drama that
has played out in Europe and the United States, while the most
prominent example of the struggle between commercial interests and
privacy interests, is far from the only one. In addition to nations
grappling with legislative responses, non-governmental organizations
such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) have addressed data privacy issues. 63 What follows is a
discussion of the most highly publicized international engagement
with data privacy issues to date-discussions and negotiations
between Europe and the United States.
Privacy is considered a fundamental right in both Europe and
the United States. 64 Beyond this generalization, however, European

the rapid spread of computers and computer networks and the unprecedented capacity
to collect, analyze, and disseminate data inexpensively and easily).
61.
Leon A. Kappelman, The Big Picture: Working in the Global Village,
INFORMATIONWEEK ONLINE, Mar. 20, 2000, at http://www.informationweek.com/
778/78uwlk.htm (observing that each additional political boundary adds legal and
other complexities to global information technology management).
62.
Eric M. Reifschneider, Book Note, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 254 (1990)
(reviewing M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF

LAW (1989)) (discussing the relationship between modern media, law, and social
change).
63.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1980 Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, available at
http:lwww.oecd.orgldsti/sti/itlsecurprodPRIV-EN.HTM.
64.
Nicole M. Buba, Note, Waging War Against Identity Theft: Should the
United States Borrow from the European Union's Battalion?, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 633, 641 (2000).
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65
and U.S. approaches to privacy have differed historically.
According to policy analyst Ari Schwartz, European nations have a
"vision" regarding privacy rights that is absent in the United
States. 66 Privacy considerations that may be considered negligible in
6 7
the United States are taken very seriously by the European Union.
68
The European emphasis on personal privacy rights
may be
attributable in part to Third Reich abuses in tracking its target
groups with invasive data-collection methods. 6 9 Today, European
nations are more likely to erect broad, prophylactic legislative
protections, whereas the United States tends to protect privacy by
reacting to crises. 70 The statutory privacy protections that do exist in
71
the United States have historically focused on the public sector,
while the EU Data Privacy Directive extends to both public and
72
private sectors alike.
Much of the modern debate over data privacy has focused on selfregulation and technological solutions, rather than legal and
regulatory responses. 73 Where the United States has favored selfregulation by business, Europe has preferred strict consumerprotection legislation that is capable of guarding privacy rights across

65.
Editorial, Privacy Here and Abroad, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1998, at A16
(observing "sharp" differences between the two approaches).
66.
James Evans, Privacy Debate Rages, INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, July 12,
2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allnws File (quoting Ari Schwartz, policy
analyst for the Center for Democracy and Technology).
67.
This difference is notable not only in comparing the EU Data Privacy
Directive to less stringent U.S. protections, but also in other areas of privacy. Most
recently, for example, the European Union has begun moving toward a unified opt-in
policy in regarding to Spain, which would replace the less rigorous opt-out policies
presently in place in a number of Member States. See Elizabeth De Bony, EU Puts
Brakes on Spain, INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, July 20, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Allnws File.
68.
The European emphasis on privacy rights is not, of course, impervious to
gaps and omissions. For example, one study recently found U.S. Internet businesses
are more likely to post privacy policies than European Internet businesses.
Specifically, ten percent of European sites examined posted privacy policies, whereas
sixty-six percent of U.S. sites examined posted privacy policies. For a discussion on

this issue, see Tech Watch: Data Protection-ForYour Eyes Only: Privacy on the Web,
TIME, Dec. 13, 1999, at 18.
69.
Monahan, supra note 36, at 283.
70.
Fromholz, supra note 60, at 462 n.1.
71.
The Author does not suggest that the private sector is never subject to
privacy laws, but rather indicates a general trend which may be changing as the
United States begins to take privacy interests more seriously.
72.
Heydrich, supra note 13, at 426 (observing that the EU Data Privacy
Directive, which applies to both public and private sectors, provides greater protection
than U.S. statutes which generally apply only to the public sector).
73.
Peronet Despeignes, Exorcising the Ghost in the Internet Machine, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at 14. "On one hand are high-technology companies promoting
self-regulation and innovations that protect people's privacy; on the other, lawmakers
determined to 'do something."' Id.
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international borders. 74 Not surprisingly, U.S. commentators are
also more likely than European commentators to recommend marketbased alternatives to legislation and regulation. 75 When the United
States does decide to address privacy through laws, it usually applies
industries or
a "sectoral approach," 7 6 passing laws to cover particular
79
78
77
areas such as credit reporting, education, financial privacy,
telephony,80 cable, 81 and video. 82 In contrast, Europe and nations
such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have enacted omnibus
data privacy laws, "covering the full spectrum of uses of personally
The legislation is broad and
identifiable information." 83
comprehensive, applying to both public and private sectors.8 4 And
countries expressly
unlike the United States, some European
85
guarantee privacy in their constitutions.
Because Europe has taken the lead in the formation of
ambitious, serious privacy legislation, EU law in this field is a
fascinating subject for examination and analysis. The following
section looks at the centerpiece of modern European privacy controls:
the EU Data Privacy Directive.

See John R. Aguilar, Over the Rainbow: Europeanand American Consumer
74.
Protection Policy and Remedy Conflicts on the Internet and a Possible Solution, 4 INT'L
J. COMM. L. & POLY 1, 13-14 (1999) (describing the U.S. stance favoring development
of internal business transparency mechanisms, and the European stance favoring
formal laws ensuring protection of e-consumers).

See, e.g., Paul Rose, Comment, A Market Response to the European Union
75.
Directive on Privacy, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 445, 450 (1999). "[Blecause of
the deep U.S. commitment to self-regulation and to the Safe Harbor Principles,
comprehensive privacy legislation is unlikely, and, as I argue, unnecessary. Although
the data market has failed consumers, privacy concerns can still be resolved through
market forces-through the creation of a privacy market." Id. (emphasis added).
Beth Givens, Privacy Expectations in a High Tech World, 16 SANTA CLARA
76.
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 348 (2000).
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
77.
78.
Family Education and Privacy Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994).
Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1994).
79.
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
80.
2394 (1991).
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780
81.
(1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59).
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
82.
83.
Givens, supra note 76, at 348-49.

Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and
84.
the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995).
85.
Monahan, supra note 36, at 283 (stating that privacy rights appear in the
constitutions of "many" European nations, and referring to Germany's constitution as
one example).
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IV. THE EU DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
The EU Data Privacy Directive is built on a tradition of serious
privacy protections.
Comprehensive European data privacy
legislation dates as far back as 1973, when Sweden passed early,
groundbreaking legislation. 86 Trans-European initiatives began as
early as 1981, when the Council of Europe solicited signatories to the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data.87 Because this Convention
was not self-executing, signature and subsequent ratification varied
among European nations so that privacy assurances varied from one
88
country to another.
The European Union set a high global standard in data privacy
protection when it forged its Data Privacy Directive,8 9 which became
effective in October 199890 and created a global model of a rigorous
legislative approach to privacy. 9 1 More specifically, it has been
described as "a top-down, mandated ... approach to the issue of data
privacy," in contrast to the U.S. "mix of legislation, regulation, and
self-regulation. 92 Like all EU Directives, it is not in itself a law;
rather, it directs each of the fifteen members of the European Union
to enact its own implementing legislation, which need not be identical
93
across Member States in many of its specifics.
The Directive's origins may seem ironic today, considering the
threat it poses to the flow of information from the European Union to

86.
Patrick E. Cole, New Challenges to the U.S. Multinational Corporation in
the European Economic Community: Data Protection Laws, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 893, 902-03 (1985).
87.
See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals With
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, European Treaty
Series, No. 108.
88.
See Fernand Keuleneer & Dirk Lontings, Privacy Protection and Personal
Data Processing in Belgium: Analysis of a New Law's Centralized Approach to
Regulation, 4 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 344, 344-45 (1993) (noting Belgium's
early failure to ratify the Convention, and subsequent criticism of its data privacy
protections).
89.
EU Directive, supra note 1.

90.

Kendra L. Darko, Someone's Watching, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1999, at

91.

See, e.g., Dana James & Kathleen V. Schmidt, Brazil Net: GrowingDemand

16.
Tempered by Privacy Regulations, MARKETING NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999, at 40 (reporting a

privacy law proposal in Brazil similar to the EU Data Privacy Directive).
92.
Sherman Katz & Edward Meyers, The Threat to U.S. Companies Created
by the EU Data Privacy Directive, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 1999, at 4.
93.
Jeffrey B. Ritter et al., Emerging Trends in InternationalPrivacy Law, 15
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 87, 94-95 (2001) (explaining that the Privacy Directive creates
minimum standards, and that national laws are allowed to vary, provided they meet
these minimum standards).

20021

EU PRIVACY DIRECTIVE

nations deemed to be non-conforming. 94 According to its preamble,
the Directive was born in part out of a desire to preserve rather than
to inhibit data flows.95
Specifically, the European Union was
concerned that data flows within Europe could be hindered if the
rules were not standardized across Member States. 96 If all EU
Member States must adopt the same protections, then no Member
State can "inhibit the free movement between them of personal data
on grounds relating to protection of the rights and freedom of
'97
individuals, and in particular the right to privacy.
Europe recognized early that nations serious about protecting
data privacy could not achieve their goals, given the global nature of
the Internet, without controlling data use outside the legislating
sovereignties. 98 Europe also understood the price of extraterritorial
control: if the privacy rights of Europeans were to be meaningful
rather than symbolic, any region or nation unable to ensure adequate
privacy protections could not be guaranteed access to data flows. If
serious regulatory privacy protections and free data flow are both of
fundamental importance, regulatory uniformity is a natural solution,
and perhaps the only one. By adopting the Directive, the European
Union essentially shifted the privacy challenge from a European level
to a global one.
This section briefly explains some of the more important
components of the Directive. Because the Directive is a lengthy and
detailed document, the discussion is intended not to be a
comprehensive analysis, but rather to highlight the European
approach to the management of data privacy.
A. Restrictionson Collection and Use of Data
The Directive protects only "personal data," defined as "any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person."99
The Directive then defines an identified or identifiable person as "one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social

94.
One commentator describes the Directive's threat as "a sword of Damocles."
Steve Jarvis, Their Way or the Autobahn?; U.S., EU Still Don't Agree on Data
Handling,MARKETING NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 5.
95.
EU Directive, supra note 1, pmbl.
96.
Id. pmbl. (7) (suggesting that different levels of privacy protection across
EU Member States regarding personal data processing might "prevent the
transmission of such data from the territory of one Member State to that of another
Member State ...").
97.
Id. pmbl. (9).
98.
Id. pmbl. (56).
99.
Id. art. 2(a).
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identity."10 0 This limitation means that European companies can
freely develop and share demographic databases as in the United
States, when they contain only abstract trends and information, and
when no data can be associated with a particular person.
The Directive's restrictions apply to collectors who engage in
personal data "processing," which is defined as operations or sets of
operations that are performed on personal data, automatically or
otherwise. 101 It includes, but is not limited to, "collection, recording,
retrieval,
or
alteration,
adaptation
storage,
organization,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction."'1 2 Processors of personal data are required
to inform data subjects of the their identities, as well as the identities
to
or categories of recipients of the data. 0 3 They are also required
10 4
explain the purposes for which the information is being collected.
In instances where the data are not obtained from the data
subject, these disclosure requirements may be inapplicable under the
terms of a hardship provision, depending on the purposes for which
the data are being used. 10 5 This potential disclosure exception
applies "where, in particular for processing for statistical purposes or
for the purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of
a
or would involve
proves impossible
such information
disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid
down by law.' 0 6 When the disclosure exception applies, the Directive
10 7
mandates Member States to provide "appropriate safeguards.'
A consumer who has been notified of personal data collection is
protected in two important ways, through opt-in rights 0 8 and
objection rights.' 0 9 These two important areas are addressed in
subsections below.
1. Opt-in Rights
The Directive's highly touted opt-in provisions'1 0 are more
limited than a casual observer might realize because the pertinent

100.
I01.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. art. 2(c).
Id. art. 2(b).
Id.
Id. arts. 10-11.
Id.
Id. art. 11(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 7.
Id. arts. 14-15.

110.
See, e.g., Steve Jarvis, Opt-In can't be stressed enough online, MARKETING
NEWS, May 21, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 6706726 (discussing the effects of opt-
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Article of the Directive contains what are, effectively, exceptions. The
opt-in provision states the rule: "Member States shall provide that
personal data may be processed only if: (a) the data subject has
unambiguously given his consent . . . ."Il The rule is immediately
followed by the crucial word "or," and five classes of exceptions, where
consent is not required. These areas of exception protect a data
collector's ability to serve either the data subject or the public interest
at large. Exceptions that protect the data subject include data
processing necessary to perform a contract with the data subject or
the pre-contractual requests of the data subject," 2 and processing
necessary to protect the data subject's vital interests.11 3 Exceptions
that protect the public interest include data processing necessary to
meet a legal requirement 1 4 and data processing "necessary for the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest." 115
These are open-textured categories that seriously undercut the
strength of the Directive's opt-in approach. They pale, however, in
comparison with the final category, which dispenses with the datasubject consent requirement when
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the
data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which
require protection under Article 1(1),116

For numerous reasons, this final exception is likely to remove some
forcefulness from the Directive's opt-in approach. The standard of
"legitimate interests"'1 7 is a low threshold and presumably is easily
met. The standard is also broad in its application, referring to both
the interests of the data collector and third persons. Perhaps most
importantly, the standard is very vague.
Self-interested data
collectors might easily interpret it in their own favor in a wide array
of situations.
2. Access and Objection Rights
The EU Data Privacy Directive provides data subjects with
access and objection rights. The rights are discussed in the following
subsections.

in privacy policies on major research firms); Donna Gillin, Opt in or opt out?,
MARKETING RESEARCH, July 1, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 19284643.
111.
EU Directive, supranote 1, art. 7(a).
112.
Id. art. 7(b).
113.
Id. art. 7(d).
114.
Id. art. 7(c).
115.
Id. art. 7(e).
116.
Id. art. 7(f).
117.
Id.
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a. Access Rights
Article 12 of the Directive provides a set of guarantees to every
data subject. Member States must assure that data subjects have a
right of access to data being collected by data controllers. 1 18 It refers
to data subjects' "right to obtain" the pertinent data "without
constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or
expense."" 9 A right to obtain suggests that tendering need not be
automatic-apparently, data controllers can require subjects to
request the data in order to receive it.
Data subjects have the right to be told whether their personal
data is being processed, and if so, for what purposes. 120 The also have
the right to receive the data that is being processed, "in an intelligible
form," as well as "any available information" regarding the source of
the data. 121 If the processing of personal data is automated-and the
Directive limits the conditions under which automated data
128
22
processing is permitted' -the data subject has, at least at times,12 4
the right to know "the logic involved" in the automated processing.
Data subjects also have the right to erase or block any data
processing not in compliance with the Directive, especially if
noncompliance is a function of the incompleteness or inaccuracy of
the data. 125 If third parties have received the data prior to such
has the right to notification of
erasure or blocking, the data subject
126
the rectification to third parties.

118.
119.

Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 12(a).

120.
121.

Id.
Id.

122.

Article 15(1) on "Automated Individual Decisions" provides:

Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a
decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects
him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to
evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at
work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.

Id. art. 15(1).
The Directive is unclear regarding the comprehensiveness of this right to
123.
access. The exact language of the provision guarantees data subjects' right to obtain
"knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at
least in the case of the automated decisions referred to in Article 15(1)." Id. art. 12(a).
One way to interpret the "at least" provision in this language is as creating a statutory
threshold for EU Member State legislation. Id. A less satisfactory interpretation is
that the "at least" provision is to be part of the Member State legislation itself. This
interpretation is less desirable because of the vagueness it would create on the face of
the statutes. For this reason alone, it seems likely that the former interpretation
better reflects the intent of the Directive.
Id.
124.
Id. art. 12(b).
125.
Id. art. 12(c).
126.
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One important point, alluded to earlier in this subsection, bears
elaboration.
Article 12 is couched in terms of Member States
guaranteeing certain rights to data subjects; therefore, implementing
legislation arguably may not place automatic burdens on data
controllers. For example, there are at least two ways to guarantee
access to information. More strictly, data controllers may be required
to send data subjects information automatically. More leniently, data
controllers may only be required to send information upon request of
the data subjects. The more lenient approach would be in compliance
with a strict, literal interpretation of the right to obtain the data.
Similarly, implementing legislation technically could guarantee
the right to rectification either by requiring automatic rectification of
errors in all cases or by requiring rectification only upon the request
of the data subject. In both of these examples, it is the data subject's
rights to obtain the stated relief from the data controller that is
guaranteed. This situation leaves room for an interpretation whereby
the data subject must act in some substantial way to trigger such a
right. Requiring data subject action could create complex and timeconsuming procedures. Indeed, given the complex nature of much
legislation and regulation, one might expect complexity of procedures.
Complicated processes are likely to undermine the consumer
interests that they are ostensibly created to protect.
b. Objection Rights
1 27
The Directive also creates a data subject's "right to object."'
Like the rights previously discussed in this Subsection, the right to
object is not always clearly delineated within the Directive. Article
14(a), for example, requires Member States to grant data subjects the
right

at least in.the cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f),
to object at any
time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular
situation to the processing of data relating to him, save where
otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there is a justified
objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer
128
involve those data ....

What remains most uncertain here is where the boundaries would or
should be drawn regarding "compelling legitimate grounds relating to
[the data subject's] particular situation to the processing of data
1 29
relating to him."'
The other curious aspect of Article 14(a) is its mandate to grant
data subjects objection rights "at least in the cases referred to in

127.
'128.
129.

Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 14(a).
Id.
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Article 7(e) and (f)."13 0 Referring back to Article 7, this suggests that
Member States must confer objection rights when "processing is
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller
or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed, ' 13 1 and when
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the
data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which
require protection under Article 1.132
In contrast, Article 14(a) suggests that Member States need not
provide objection rights when data is being processed for any of the
other authorized reasons. The logic behind this distinction is obvious
in terms of the first basis for data processing, where "the data subject
has unambiguously given his consent. ' 13 3
Unambiguous consent
logically vitiates the value of and the need for objection rights-one
can safely assume that the data subject does not object where there is
express consent.
The logic in distinguishing the remaining categories of data
processing is less clear; why should Member States not allow data
subjects to object when data are being processed because "processing
is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data
subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data
subject prior to entering into a contract"?13 4 This exemplifies a class
of cases that is defined by the data processor by employing an
element of discretion and judgment, with which the data subject may
well disagree.
Likewise, data subjects may have problems with
processing justified as "necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject,"11 5 or "necessary in order
to protect the vital interests of the data subject. ' 13 6 In each case, the
processor's assessment could easily be a contestable stretch. It is
difficult to see why Member States must provide objection rights in
some instances, but not in these.
The second provision for data subject objection is more
straightforward and less troublesome. It requires Member States to
grant data subjects the right
to object, on request and free of charge, to the processing of personal
data relating to him which the controller anticipates being processed
for the purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. art. 7(e).
Id. art. 7(f).
Id. art. 7(a).
Id. art. 7(b).
Id. art. 7(c).
Id. art. 7(d).
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data are disclosed for the first time to third parties or used on their
behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered
37
the right to object free of charge to such disclosures or uses.1

This language is relatively clear, makes no counterintuitive or
curious distinctions among what appear to be like situations, and
addresses one of the primary contemporary concerns138regarding data
privacy-its use and distribution by direct marketers.
B. Restrictions on Data Flows to Countries Lacking Adequate Privacy
Protections
Among the most controversial aspects of the Directive is its
potential effect on other nations that interact with or do business in
Europe. 139 Under the Directive, EU Member States are to block the
flow of information from Europe to nations lacking acceptable privacy
protections. 140 Specifically, Article 25, Section 1 of the Directive
states,
Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for
processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to
compliance with national provisions adopted pursuant to the other
provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an
141
adequate level of protection.

Article 25's limitation to "personal data which are undergoing
processing or are intended for processing" 142 may seem to mitigate
the provision's potential severity. Yet, in reality, Article 25 would
affect virtually all personal data transmissions. This occurs because
the definitions section indicates that "processing of personal data"
includes a very broad array of activities, including "collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
143
erasure, or destruction."'
Article 25, Section 2 provides guidance in interpreting what
exactly qualifies as "an adequate level of protection." Adequacy is to

Id. art. 14(b).
137.
Bergerson, supra note 40, at 1528-29 (citing recent Harris poll results
138.
showing a dramatic increase, from the 1970s to the 1990s, in consumer concern
regarding use of personal information).
In today's global market, entities in all nations are likely to interact or do
139.
business with Europe. Accordingly, the provision of the EU Directive restricting data
flows is likely to have worldwide impact.
140.
Raf Casert, EU, U.S. Reach Deal on Data Privacy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 16859024.
EU Directive, supra note 1, art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
141.
Id.
142.
Id. art. 2(b).
143.
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be assessed by looking at all the circumstances that surround data
transfer operations, with particular attention to
the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of
final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in
the third country in question and the professional rules and security
measures which are complied with in that country. 144

Article 26 of the Directive does provide some potential relief from
the severity of Article 25's data flow restrictions. Under Article 26,
countries not ensuring adequate protection under the provisions of
Article 25 may still receive personal data transfers under a
disjunctive list of circumstances. 145 These circumstances are similar
to those listed in Article 7, circumscribing when personal data may be
processed in Member States. 146 The specific language of Article 26 is

as follows:
Derogations
1.
By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where otherwise
provided by domestic law governing particular cases, Member States
shall provide that a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a
third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection
within the meaning of Article 25(2) may take place on condition that:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the
proposed transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract
between the data subject and the controller or the implementation of
precontractual measures taken in response to the data subject's
request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the
controller and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public
interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal
claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of
the data subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or
regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which
is open to consultation either by the public in general or by any
person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that
the conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the
particular case.
2.
Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may
authorize a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third
country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection within
the meaning of Article 25(2), where the controller adduces adequate
safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the

144.
145.
146.

Id. art. 25(2).
Id. art. 26.
See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.

2002]

2 EU

PRIVACY DIRECTIVE

exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards may in particular
result from appropriate contractual clauses.
3.
The Member State shall inform the Commission and the other
Member States of the authorizations it grants pursuant to paragraph 2.
If a Member State or the Commission objects on justified grounds
involving the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and
freedoms of individuals, the Commission shall take appropriate
measures in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31(2).
Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with the
Commission's decision.
Where the Commission decides, in accordance with the procedure
4.
referred to in Article 31(2), that certain standard contractual clauses
offer sufficient safeguards as required by paragraph 2, Member States
shall take the necessary measures to comply with the Commission's
14 7
decision.

These exemptions mimic the vague exemptions of Article 7, and thus
share some of that Article's ambiguities. 148 These ambiguities could
create "wiggle-room" for U.S. and other non-EU businesses,
Apart from
potentially jeopardizing the Directive's efficacy. 149
potential ambiguities, the apparent intent here is to ensure that, even
if a non-EU nation has not passed rigorous privacy protection laws,
data flows are not restricted in particular instances where Europe's
own rigorous requirements would have been met.
The Directive's data flow restrictions respond to the valid
concern that the European legislation will be substantially
undermined if it fails to account for use of personal data once it goes
beyond EU borders. 150 This concern over international spillover
effects' 5 1 was recognized as early as 1980, when the OECD issued its
Guidelines. 152 The Guidelines established principles for companies
around the world to apply in the fair collection and use of personal
information. 15 3 Unlike the OECD Guidelines, however, the EU

147.
EU Directive, supra note 1, art. 26.
See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
148.
149.
Stephen A. Oxman, Note, Exemptions to the European Union PersonalData
Privacy Directive: Will They Swallow the Directive?, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
191, 198 (2000) (observing that vague provisions in the Directive jeopardize datasubject privacy protections).
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
150.
InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 132, 156 (2001). "[I]n recognition of the ease with
which personal data on Europeans can be transferred electronically outside the EU, the
directive sought to prohibit transfers to non-EU states unless those states provide an
'adequate' level of data protection." Id.
Spillover effects are "effects of conduct [that] extend beyond pre-established
151.
geographical boundaries---or 'spill over' into other jurisdictions .... " David G. Post &
David R. Johnson, The New Civic Virtue of the Net: Lessons from Models of Complex
21 (STAN. TECH. L. REV., Working
Systems for the Governance of Cyberspace, 1997,
Paper), at http:llstlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Working-Papers/97-Post_1/index.htm.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
152.
Jonathan P. Cody, Comment, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the
153.
Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1189-90 (1999).
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Directive creates a palpable threat that nations with lax privacy
54
protections will lose access to European data flows.'
If non-European nations are to avoid losing access to European
data under the Directive, they will have to qualify by creating
acceptable "Safe Harbor" provisions. These are the provisions that
will specify what non-EU nations must do to qualify as adequately
protecting privacy. During 1999 and 2000, the European Union and
the United States negotiated a Safe Harbor agreement, and other
nations are likely to follow suit to ensure that data flows from Europe
remain unimpeded. 155
The subsections below discuss the
development and negotiation of the U.S. Safe Harbor provisions.
1. U.S. Safe Harbor Provisions Development and Negotiation
In April 1999, the U.S. Commerce Department submitted a draft
to the European Union of a proposed Safe Harbor agreement, called
the International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles. 156 A purported
goal of these Principles was to develop compliance standards that
were predictable and unambiguous. 157 Although the European Union
did not accept the original proposals, its Article 31 Committee on
158
Data Privacy eventually approved a subsequent version.
By March 2000, the European Union and the U.S. Commerce
Department had forged a tentative Safe Harbor agreement, 159 subject
to EU Parliamentary Comment and final EU approval. 60 Initial
reports suggested that final approval of the pact would be a
formality, 161 despite protests by consumer groups that the agreement
failed to provide sufficient protection to European privacy

154.
Deborah Hargreaves, Experts Back Brussels and US Data Protection Deal,
FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at 13 (discussing the Directive's potential threat to the flow
of information to countries lacking adequate privacy protections).
155.
No peeping toins, please, ECON. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL
16891228.
156.
James Heckman, Marketers waiting, will see on EU privacy, MARKETING
NEWS, June 7, 1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 7723071.
157.
E-Coinmerce Developments of Note: U.S. Reaches Privacy Accord with EU
on Data Protection, E-COMMERCE, Apr. 2000, at 8 (identifying provision of "clear and
predictable guidance" as a goal in drafting the ultimate Safe Harbor proposal).
158.
Elizabeth de Bony, EU Overwhelmingly Approves U.S. Data-Privacy
Regulations; Should make conducting business in Europe easier, COMPUTERWORLD,
June 5, 2000, at 28, available at 2001 WL 2176532.
159.
U.S. and EuropeAgree on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2000, at C4.
160.
The European Commission, Data Protection: Commission Adopts Decisions
Recognising Adequacy of Regimes in US, Switzerland and Hungary, July 27, 2000, available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/dataprot/news/safeharbor.htm
(discussing EU Parliamentary comment and EU approval) [hereafter Adequacy of Regimes].
161.
See, e.g., Enterprise Systems, COMPUTING, June 15, 2000, at 6 (indicating
that the pact was expected to be "rubber stamped" by the Commission in late July
2000).
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interests. 162 According to a consumers' forum called Transatlantic
Consumer Dialogue, "the safe harbor system would not provide
European citizens with the adequate level of protection that they are
163
guaranteed under EU law."'
A majority of the European Parliament objected to the U.S
proposal. 164 The vote was close: in July 2000, the EU Parliament
rejected the proposed Safe Harbor provisions by a vote of 279 to 259,
with twenty-two abstentions. 165 Italian Member Elena Ornella
Paciott suggested that present U.S. privacy policy was not sufficiently
developed to support current adoption of the negotiated Safe Harbor
provisions.' 6 6 The Parliament's Citizens' Rights Committee was also
concerned that the Safe Harbor agreement "contained several
67
loopholes."'
Implementation and enforcement were major concerns. 68 The
European Parliament's resolution recommended an amendment to
provide for an independent body that would be empowered to hear
complaints regarding privacy abuses, as well as a mechanism by
which victims of privacy abuses could receive damages.' 6 9 Although
the European Parliament's resolution did not bind the European
Commission, 170 commentators suggested it would be impolitic for the
Commission to ignore the resolution without in some way addressing

EU Backs Data PrivacyAct, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 5, 2000, at 57.
162.
No Safe Harbor For Data, INTELLIGENT ENTER., June 5, 2000, at 11,
163.
available at 2000 WL 11677727.
Why privacy matters-EuropeanDirector General to speak out next week
164.
(March 23-24) at privacy open seminar in Brussels, M2 PRESSWIRE, Mar. 16, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 16125616.
165.
Jennifer DiSabatino & Greg Stedman, U.S. /Europe Privacy Deal Sent Back
for More Talks; European Parliament rejects proposal; safe harbor agreement in
question, COMPUTERWORLD, July 17, 2000, at 24.
166.
Elizabeth de Bony, Europeans Pan U.S. Privacy Plan, INFOWORLD DAILY
NEWS, July 6, 2000, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File (quoting European
Parliament Member Elena Ornella Paciott, "The Parliament takes the view that the
adequacy of the U.S. system cannot be confirmed and, consequently, the free movement
of data cannot be authorized until all the components of the safe harbor system are
operational and the United States authorities have informed the Commission that
these conditions have been fulfilled .... ").
167.
Robert MacMillan, Parliament Pauses on EU-US Privacy Plan-Update,
NEWSBYTES, June 30, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
168.
Adequacy of Regimes, supra note 160 (reporting that the July 5 EU
Parliament Resolution found individual remedies in the event of privacy breaches to be
lacking in the Safe Harbor provisions).
169.
DiSabatino & Stedman, supra note 165.
The Parliament's rulings concerning whether the Commission followed
170.
proper procedures are binding; in this instance, the Parliament voted by a margin of
five votes against a finding of procedural flaws. The Parliament's findings regarding
the substantive adequacy of an EU Commission action is not binding, and the
Commission is not required to adhere to those findings. For a discussion, see Juliana
Gruenwald, European Parliament Says "No" to Safe Harbor, NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY,
July 13, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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the Parliament's concerns. 17 Nonetheless, the Commission approved
the Safe Harbor agreement on July 26, 2000,172 stating to the EU
Parliament that the arrangement did indeed provide "adequate
protection."'173 A subsequent corrigendum verified that the Commission
174
was acting within the scope of its authority in its approval.
2. The Nature of the Safe Harbor Principles
Companies that intend to comply with the principles certify
themselves by notifying the U.S. Commerce Department of their
intent to do so. 1 75 To become a self-certified organization qualified to
receive data, an entity must "unambiguously" and "publicly" disclose
its commitment to comply with the Safe Harbor Principles. 17 6 To be
eligible for this self-certification process, the organization must be
subject to a U.S. government body "empowered to investigate
complaints and to obtain relief against unfair or deceptive practices
as well as redress for individuals, irrespective of their country of
residence or nationality, in case of non-compliance with the
1 77
Principles.'
The enumeration of the actual guidelines themselves is very
informal. The Federal Register lists and briefly explains Safe Harbor
Principles, upon which it elaborates in a set of "frequently asked
questions," or FAQs. 178 The Safe Harbor Principles cover rights of
data subjects regarding notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data

171.
de Bony, supra note 166.
172.
Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by
the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by
the U.S. Department of Commerce. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L
215) 7 [hereafter Commission Decision].
173.
Telecommunications and Information Technology, BUS. GUIDE TO EU
INITIATIVES, ch. 9, 2000/2001 (reporting the public declaration of Commissioner Frits
Bolkestein before the EU Parliament's Committee on Citizens and Civil Rights).
174.
Corrigendum to Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000
Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of European Parliament and of the Council on the
adequacy of protection provided by the Safe Harbor privacy principles and related
frequently asked questions issued by the Department of Commerce. 2001 O.J. (L 115)
14 ("The Commission ...concluded that although the European Parliament expressed
the view that certain improvements needed to be made to the 'Safe Harbor Principles'
and related FAQs before it could be considered to provide 'adequate protection', it did
not establish that the Commission would exceed its powers in adopting the decision.").
175.
Commission Decision, supra note 172.
176.
Id. art. 1(2)(a).
177.
Id. art. 1(2)(b).
178.
Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000) [hereafter Principles] (modified in
part by Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission;
Procedures and Start Date for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534, Sept. 19, 2000).
The FAQs also are available at on the EU's web page, at http://www.europa.eu.int/
comminternalmarket/en/dataprot/news/safeharbor.htm.
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integrity, access, and enforcement. 179 If they remain in compliance
with their own self-regulatory privacy policies,1 80 certified parties
remain eligible to receive data from the European Union and are
shielded from EU Data Privacy Directive sanctions. 18 ' European
organizations that want to send data to the United States can verify
Safe Harbor compliance registration via an updated web page. 8 2 If a
self-certified company fails to comply with the principles, Member
States can suspend data flows to an organization under stipulated
18 3
conditions.
The U.S. development of Safe Harbor Principles demonstrates its
acknowledgement of a need to respond to the Privacy Directive's data
flow provisions. However, the voluntary registration process in the
Principles is one of "self-certification,"184 which has led some
observers to question whether the United States is making real
concessions or simply shielding its traditional self-regulation posture
185
behind a smoke-screen of illusory changes.
Purported implementation deficiencies under the Safe Harbor
agreement added to concerns that U.S. concessions were mere

179.
Id.
180.
See infra note 189 and accompanying text (elaborating on the selfregulatory nature of the development of privacy policies that comply with the Safe
Harbor agreement).
181.
Cheryl
Rosen,
European
Parliament
Nixes
Safe
Harbor,
INFORMATIONWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 40.
182.
Safe Harbor List, available at http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/
webPages/safe+harbor+list.
183.
Article 3(1) of the Commission Decision permits such cessation of data
flows by Member States under the following conditions:
(a) the government body in the United States referred to in Annex VII to this
Decision or an independent recourse mechanism within the meaning of letter
(a) of the Enforcement Principle set out in Annex I to this Decision has
determined that the organisation is violating the Principles implemented in
accordance with the FAQs; or
(b) there is a substantial likelihood that the Principles are being violated; there
is a reasonable basis for believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned
is not taking or will not take adequate and timely steps to settle the case at
issue; the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to
data subjects; and the competent authorities in the Member State have made
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to provide the organisation with
notice and an opportunity to respond.
Commission Decision, supra note 172, arts. 3(1)(a)-(b).
184.
Ron N. Dreben & Johanna L. Werbach, Senators Versus Governors: State
and Federal Regulation of E-Commerce, COMPUTER LAW., June 2000, at 3, 11 (stating
that U.S. companies would become'Safe Harbor eligible under the proposed agreement
by "self-certifying" their willingness to abide by the agreement's privacy principles).
185.
U.S. Companies Fail European Personal Data Privacy Requirements,
PRECISION MARKETING, Aug. 31, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 11462796 (citing a
report claiming that U.S. companies are not doing enough to guard personal data,
despite the Safe Harbor Principles).
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Monitoring and enforcement to police the
window-dressing. 186
agreement in the United States technically would fall under the aegis
of the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of
The degree and rigor of monitoring and
Transportation. 187
enforcement are unclear, so that the self-certification process remains
a stumbling block for some distrustful critics. 188 Indeed, the text of
the Commerce Department's November 1999 proposal clearly
demonstrates that, despite potential actions for unfair or deceptive
practices, Safe Harbor procedures are largely self regulatory:
Decisions by organizations to qualify for the safe harbor are entirely
voluntary, and organizations may qualify for the safe harbor in
different ways. Organizations that decide to adhere to the principles
must comply with the principles in order to obtain and retain the
benefits of the safe harbor and publicly declare that they do so. For
example, if an organization joins a self regulatory privacy program that
adheres to the principles, it qualifies for the safe harbor. Organizations
may also qualify by developing their own self regulatory privacy policies
provided that they conform with the principles. Where in complying
with the principles, an organization relies in whole or in part on self
regulation, its failure to comply with such self regulation must also be
actionable under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts or another law or regulation
18 9
prohibiting such acts.

Note that, under this language, potential liability for Safe
Harbor violations obtains as a result of failure to do what a company
says it is going to do, within the bounds of its own privacy policies.
Determining what those privacy policies actually are is the
responsibility of the self-certifying company. In the absence of some
pre-certification external review or scrutiny of the policies
themselves, sanctions triggered solely by a company's violation of
those policies are weak. A certified company that meticulously
complies with its own poorly developed policies can easily fall short of
providing meaningful privacy protection..
This result is a potentially enormous efficacy gap in the Safe
Harbor Principles. Nevertheless, attempted good-faith compliance
with Safe Harbor Principles could require many U.S. firms to
reassess their present data-sharing and data-retention procedures

186.
Safe harbour creates a transatlanticstorm, PRECISION MARKETING, Apr.
13, 2001, at 11, available at 2001 WL 11461787 (noting the opinions of some industry
experts that the Safe Harbor agreement is just another "vain attempt to curb the EU's
obsession with paperwork and get a model contract signed and sealed.").
Rosen, supra note 181.
187.
188.
Consumers Highly Criticalof EU! United States Data ProtectionAgreement,
EUR. REP., Apr. 5, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8841413. "U.S. consumer organizations
have little confidence in the effectiveness of the self-regulatory system for protecting
personal information." Id.
189.
Draft: International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles Issued by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Nov. 15, 1999, available at http://ita.doc.gov/td/
ecom/Principles1199.htm.
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and to make substantial changes to current practices. 190 If the U.S.
Safe Harbor program does confer any incremental privacy protection
within the European Union, it will likely be scattershot, given efficacy
holes in the self-certification process.
Commentators disagree about whether the United States gave
away too much or too little in the Safe Harbor agreement. In the
United States, privacy advocates who would generally applaud the
spirit of the Directive wonder how and why the United States will
now confer greater privacy protection to Europeans than to U.S.
citizens. 191 Other non-European critics have voiced concern over the
Safe Harbor Principles on a number of grounds. Some believe that
the approach is "excessive," extending protections "beyond consumer
concern," and suggest that such stringent restrictions could harm
international trade generally and the European economy
specifically. 1 92 David Flint observes that, "[F]or many, the impact of
the European Union directive on data protection is likely to have a
severely constraining effect on the cross-continental sharing of
[S]ince the law on data protection is drawn quite
important data ....
if any, non-EU countries that meet its
are
few,
tightly, there
93
standards."1
These concerns are exacerbated by the character of the
guidelines for determining the adequacy of data protection. As was
just observed, assessors of data protection measures are to look not
only at a nation's policies and practices, but also at institutionThe directive suggests a case-by-case
specific variables. 194
compliance assessment on top of the nation-by-nation Safe Harbor
principles assessment, increasing the potential drag on international
195
commerce.

190.

Patrick

Thibodeau,

Europe

and

U.S.

Agree

on

Data

Rules,

COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 20, 2000, at 6 (noting that Safe Harbor compliance could
require some companies to make painful changes, particularly in regard to the transfer
of data to third parties).
This concern arose during negotiations of the Safe Harbor Principles.
191.
Keith Perine, Not Enough Privacy?, INDUS. STANDARD, July 3, 2000, available at 2000
WL 31584023 (noting privacy advocate Jason Catlett's concern that U.S. firms are now
to give better privacy protections to Europeans than to Americans).
Stan Beer, US Marketer Attacks EU Privacy Code, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV.,
192.
Aug. 8, 1998, at 23.
David Flint, EU and the Rest of the World Divided Over Data Protection,
193.
SCOTSMAN, Sept. 24, 2001, at 20, available at 2001 WL 27630394.
EU Directive, supra note 1, art. 25(2).
194.
195.
Because each entity decides to certify under its own set of compliance
procedures, there are potentially thousands of different versions of compliance, each of
which would be evaluated and assessed individually. Both the number of entities and
the variety of programs they use to comply with the Safe Harbor principles increase
potential unwieldiness of EU monitoring and enforcement. At least two possible
results arise-that the European Union will monitor aggressively, and may stall data
flows in the process of the cumbersome challenge or that the burden of monitoring
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As some domestic observers question whether the United States
has given up too much, the concern of the EU Parliament is that the
United States has given away too little. 19 6 Driven by fears that the
Safe Harbor Principles lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms, the
EU Parliament's fears seem to have some merit, given the slow pace
at which U.S. companies have responded to the provisions. As of a
March 2001 report, a mere two dozen or so U.S. companies had
registered as Safe Harbor compliant. 197 By August 2001, the number
had risen to about seventy, 198 a miniscule portion of all U.S. firms.
Perhaps partially in response to concerns that meaningful data flow
controls under the Privacy Directive may fizzle, the European Union
is pressing implementation forward. 199
One final note is warranted. The specifics of the U.S. Safe
Harbor Principles are complex, and since they have been examined by
others in detail, 200 and go beyond the scope of this Article, they will
not be examined here. 20 ' Ironically, the importance of the provisions
is now coming into question, as there have been few U.S. companies
that have bothered to register with the U.S. Commerce Department
as Safe Harbor compliant. 20 2 The final impact of the Directive's data
flow restrictions is yet to be seen.

these thousands of entities will be unmanageable, and monitoring and enforcement
will be nominal or nonexistent.
See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
196.
197.
Marilyn Geewax, Key Congressman says European Rules on Net Privacy
Could Hurt U.S. Commerce, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 9, 2001, at 5C.
Jarvis, supra note 94, at 5.
198.
EC Ignores U.S. E-Trade Threat: The European Commission is Ignoring
199.
U.S. Requests to Slow Down the Implementation of its Data Privacy Directive Despite
Fears that the Issue Could Spark an E.commerce Trade War, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE
(VNU), FIN. TIMES INFORMATION, May 8, 2001, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allnws File (discussing EU firmness in pressing forward application of the data flow
provisions of the Privacy Directive).
See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers:
200.
Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor"Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy
Directive, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 735 (2001).
201.
Donna Gillin, Safe HarborPrinciplesfor the European Privacy Directive are
Finalized, MARKETING RESEARCH, Winter 2000, at 41 (describing briefly the basics of
the Safe Harbor Principles).
202.
Geewax, supra note 197.
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V. THE EU APPROACH AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. The Challenge

In terms of international relations, the Internet is truly a doubleedged sword. In many ways, it has the potential to facilitate and
improve relations between countries, to enhance human rights, and
to support world peace.20 3 Yet to realize and exploit this potential,
nations must support a new technology that is more global than any
that has preceded it, and efforts to create workable worldwide
Internet policies can backfire, leading to short-term international
strife. 20 4 Westbrook summarizes the situation aptly: "A new world is
slouching toward New York and London, Beijing and Bangkok, to be
born. If our planet and our values survive the secondary effects of
that emergence, we may look forward to a humanity more
prosperous
'20 5
and more integrated than at any time in human history.
A brief examination of the two conflicting aspects of Internet
technology, potentially enhanced international relations and
potentially increased transitional strife, is warranted.
1. The Potential for Enhanced International Relations, Human
Rights, and World Peace
Internet technology has the potential to be a powerful agent in
affecting positive global change. By enhancing communications
around the world, it supports transnational discourse in ways and to
degrees previously unimaginable.20 6 As the world continues to
interact more frequently and regularly, the potential for the creation
of a true global community grows.

203.
Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1127 (1998). "The Internet, respectable commentators tell us,
will foster tolerance, promote democracy, redistribute wealth, improve writing and
reading skills, destroy trade barriers, and bring world peace." Id.
204. McTigue observes this potential, specifically in relation to globally
conflicting privacy policies and philosophies. Deborah M. McTigue, Marginalizing
Individual Privacy on the Internet, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5, 95, 112-13 (1999)
(observing the potential for differing privacy approaches to result in discord among
nations, due to the global collectivity of Internet networks).
205.
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2276-77 (2000) (citations omitted).
206.
For a discussion of characteristics and limitations of this discourse, see C.
Edwin Baker, An Economic Critiqueof Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1357, 1425 (2000).
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A global community may be a good thing or a bad thing,
depending in part on the quality of the values that sustain it. A
global community where human rights are respected, for example, is
superior to one in which human rights are routinely abrogated. The
very nature of Internet technology is likely to support rather than
undermine human rights, because the Internet is a tool facilitating
free speech, even in the face of attempted despotism. 20 7 By virtue of
its unruliness, the Internet paradoxically may lead to higher quality
rule because it allows dissident voices to be heard. 208 In a developing
global arena, forces for human rights will always be strong, but to be
galvanized, people must learn about the institutions that need
changing. The Internet's inexorably open forum cannot help but
20 9
facilitate the process.
The Internet will be the foundation for a global discourse in
which voices of reason cannot be smothered. While this is no
guarantor of global harmony and peace, it is an infrastructure that is
likely to help move the world in the right direction. The evolution of
a global village suggests the decline of the symbolic power of
sovereignty and the rise of a global ethos. 2 10 A move from "us versus
them" to simply "us" can be a logical precursor to unification of
interests and enhanced international relations. 21 1 Nonetheless, as
will be seen in the next subsection, these ideal effects of technology
are not so easily realized. The very nature of the Internet suggests
that, on the way to this idealized world, technology may in fact
increase, rather than mitigate, international frictions.

207.
Gary Andrew Poole, Despots Find Dissidents on Internet Hard to Muzzle,
USA TODAY, Jan. 26; 1999, at 15A (discussing difficulties in controlling dissident voices
over the Internet in various countries around the world).
208.
See generally John T. Delacourt, Recent Development, The International
Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 207, 220 (1997).
209.
For an elaboration of the Internet's inexorable value to dissident voices, see
Delacourt, supra note 208, at 220.
210.
This is not to suggest that sovereignty is either dead or moribund, but
rather that it becomes increasingly troublesome as the world shrinks and global
interactions escalate. Stephen Krasner provides an excellent analysis that addresses
the functions and limitations of sovereignty as the working model for contemporary
global governance. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as
the Global Norm, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651 (1997).
211.
This process will be expedited by a truly free Internet, and is impeded when
nations attempt to censor the Internet to avert what are viewed as threats to national
culture. Amy Knoll, Comment, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the
Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275, 299 (1996) (suggesting that some Asian
countries have controlled Internet information dissemination to ensure that it is
aligned with their cultural norms).
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2. The Potential for International Strife
In the short run, the Internet poses challenges that could create
more international problems than it solves. This possibility results
from the strains that volatile, globe-spanning technologies cannot
help placing on international relations. These strains are a function
of the dimensions of both time and space.
a. Time
Development of modern technologies and concomitant social
change continue to accelerate. 2 12 It is harder than ever to foresee the
technologies that will emerge within five- and ten-year horizons,
much less to recognize the legal, social, and economic challenges such
innovations will pose. 213
Consider a recording industry taken
unaware by MP3 technology, or brick-and-mortar businesses
unprepared for the competitive challenges of e-commerce threats in
the 1990s.
Less predictable technologies bring with them less
predictable alterations in social and economic realities as well, and
hence less predictable challenges to the legal systems that monitor
and control those realities. 2 14 The deliberative processes of legal
change are poorly equipped to respond rapidly and effectively to these
fast-changing demands.2 15 An unprecedented bad fit exists between
the tasks law faces and the processes in which it engages. This bad
216
fit creates strains on the legal system.

212.
Shamoil Shipchandler, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer
to the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 444 (2000) (referring to the
Internet as "rapidly changing").
213.
Steven Bercu, Book Note, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299 (1991) (reviewing TOM
FORESTER & PERRY MORRISON, COMPUTER ETHICS: CAUTIONARY TALES AND ETHICAL
DILEMMAS IN COMPUTING (1990)). "Technological change penetrates society faster than
we can form new attitudes, reach new consensuses, or adapt our legal and ethical
codes. Adaptation must occur if we are to cope adequately with the new problems--or
to recognize old problems in new garb-that the technologies bring." Id.
214.
Both MP3 technology and e-commerce generally are examples of how shifts
in technology bring about new social and economic challenges to the legal system. MP3
technology requires reexamination of copyright law, and particularly contributory
infringement doctrine. E-commerce has raised questions of equitable sales tax policies,
as well as the nature of the nexus requirement for out-of-state sales tax collection
purposes.
215.
Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in
Genes and Gene Fragments:A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85
IOWA L. REV. 735, 796 (2000) (observing that "if the law responds too slowly to rapid
technological change, it is apt to be too slow in fostering norms that might respond to
such change.").
216.
A good example here is the problem of cybersquatting. Speculators began
to cybersquat in the early to mid-1990s, coincident with the public's gaining
widespread access to the Internet. Cybersquatting has been troublesome under
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b. Space
Modern legal strains associated with time are exacerbated by
further legal strains associated with space. Technology has sparked
an increase in international transactions, 217 thereby also increasing
the instances in which conflicting parties are likely to call on
conflicting sovereignty- based legal systems. Comity and conflict of
law issues are magnified when separate legal systems come head-tohead.218
Because the stakes are growing, sovereign nations can be
expected to press their own interests and philosophies in the global
marketplace of laws and customs. 219 Selling one's own legal doctrines
globally is more than just an effort to gain influence for isolated
It incorporates a recognition that a global technology
purposes.
ultimately seeks unified global policy solutions and that an
aggressively pushed approach has the potential to become the
dominant one, or even the only viable one. Within this legal "global
scene,"220 the negotiation of Internet-related laws and policies is
likely to occur in a fiercely competitive arena.
Escalating stakes and fierce competition over global laws and
policies are a natural breeding ground for international strife.

trademark analysis because a true cybersquatter who does not use the relevant domain
name creates no confusion, tarnishment, or dilution. Lawmakers addressed this
problem after dozens of high-profile cases emerged, but they only enacted anticybersquatting legislation in 1999. By that time, much of the problem had already
been solved, as businesses subsequent to 1999 are, of course, more knowledgeable and
aware of e-commerce than were companies earlier in the decade. Reservation of
domain names is second nature now; when it was not second nature, and the need for
legal doctrines was greatest, businesses acted in a legal vacuum. There simply is not
much time for legislators to recognize that a problem exists, identify the issues,
identify possible solutions, debate the benefits and costs of those solutions, select an
P. Wayne Hale, The
approach, and draft and rehash statutory language.

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act & Sporty's Farm L.L.C v. Sportsman's
Market, Inc., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205 (2001) (discussing the 1999
anticybersquatting statute).
217.
John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational
CorporationsStrike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 467-68 (2000) (observing that
the Internet will spawn an increase in international trade).
218.
Joshua S. Bauchner, Note and Comment, State Sovereignty and the

Globalizing Effects of the Internet: A Case Study of the Privacy Debate, 26 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 689 (2000) (discussing this problem as it relates to the EU Data Privacy
Directive).
This is part of a broader phenomenon, which Alan Wright refers to as
219.
"trading nations . .. [jockeying] for globally competitive positions." Alan Wright, The

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Process Patent Protection, 43 AM.
U. L. REV. 603, 617 (1994).

220.

Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of

Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 223 (1999) (arguing that "[w]hen legal academics
can agree about little else, they do agree that they are players in a global scene, whose
theories and policy proposals are of global significance.").
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Approaches that are consistent with a nation's culture and interests
will be highly valued, and efforts to thwart these approaches can be
threatening.2 21 For these reasons, a nation or region that takes a
dominating or aggressive approach in the forging of laws and policies
may increase the potential for international discord.
B. The EU DataPrivacy Directiveas an Approach to Internet
Governance
Two of its characteristics make the EU Data Privacy Directive
an interesting example or model for Internet governance in the global
environment of modern technology, as described in the preceding
subsection. First, the Directive takes a strong position. 222 Its solid
22 3
pro-privacy philosophy-in comparison to U.S. law, for example gives the Directive forcefulness. Second, the Directive's data flow
restrictions are aggressive. They take a powerful global stand. It
would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the data flow provisions
are a threat to nations outside the European Union. 2 24 This fact is
not to suggest that the provisions are pernicious, but rather that they
confront, rather than appeal to, other nations and regions. The
Directive limits global negotiations on the fundamental issue of
consumer data privacy. Although the details of conformity are
subject to some negotiation-some give and take, as seen with the
U.S. Safe Harbor negotiations-the basic requirements applied to
non-European nations are non-negotiable.
The European Union
forged fundamental privacy tenets for the world, then gave notice
that failure to conform would imperil vital data flows.
Questions arise when these details are analyzed within the
context of the preceding subsection: do the Directive and its
aggressive approach threaten global harmony? Or do the Directive
and its philosophy provide the world with a high-quality stance on
data privacy, along with a strong impetus to comply, establishing the
kind of unified global policy that contemporary technological society

221.
Laws and legal culture obviously are a subset of a nation's larger, more
overarching culture. The match between the rule'of law and legal culture is an
important one. Orna Ben-Naftali & Sean S. Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action:
Lebanese Hostages in Israel, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 208 (2000) (discussing one
instance of the quality of the match between Israeli culture and detention law).
222.
Assey and Eleftheriou describe the Directive as "sweeping privacy
legislation creating strong protections governing the collection and use of personal
data." Assey & Eleftheriou, supranote 29, at 145.
223.
Malla Pollack, Opt-In Government: Using the Internet to Empower ChoicePrivacy Application, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 653, 658 (2001) (referring to "pro-privacy
Europe and consumer-beware United States").
224.
This threat has been recognized since the early 1990s. See, e.g., George B.
Trubow, The European Harmonization of Data Protection Laws Threatens U.S.
Participationin Trans Border DataFlow, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 159 (1992).
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will demand? To begin to address these questions, scholars need to
examine whether the Directive is built on a solid global foundation of
shared norms and values with regard to data privacy. They will also
need to explore the implications of recent global events.
1. Does the Directive Capture a Global Perspective on Privacy?
Whether the initiative reflects a reasonable degree of global
consensus is a central issue in assessing any aggressive, global legal
initiative. If it does, then the risks of creating discord with a
domineering posture are reduced, and the potential rewards in terms
of forging a global philosophy are increased. 2 25 That is to say, the
wisdom of attempts to force a global policy fit, in the interests of the
expediency demanded by rapid technological change, increases when
the global arena is already prepared for a unified approach.2 2 6 The
more that global players embrace similar ideologies, the greater is the
chance that they will view efforts like the EU Data Privacy Directive
as leadership rather than aggression.2 27
Such differences in

225.
This is similar to the issues that arise when nations try to impose their
influence through extraterritorially applied laws, in areas such as antitrust and
international bribery. The Author has addressed whether extraterritorial bribery
legislation overreaches in light of cultural differences, in numerous previous articles.
See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International
Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 HARV J. ON
LEGIS. 67 (2001); Steven R. Salbu, TransnationalBribery: The Big Questions, 21 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 435 (2001); Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New
Millennium, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 47 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419 (1999);
Steven R. Salbu, ExtraterritorialRestriction of Bribery: A PrematureEvocation of the
Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in
the Global Market: A CriticalAnalysis of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 229 (1997).
226.
The need for groundwork is commonly acknowledged. See, e.g., Leaders
Gather, Explore Solutions, BUS. WIRE, May 22, 2001.
227.
For example, industry activity may comprise a bottom-up approach
(compared to government edict), whereby e-commerce companies could lead in the
development of policies that eventually develop broad support, precisely because
decentralized processes build on inputs from multiple constituencies. Decentralized
processes also yield a variety of approaches that can then "battle it out" in the
marketplace in order to achieve dominance, based at least in part on the superiority of
the dominant approach. Such efforts could then channel in to transnational laws that
are built on a reasonably uniform foundation. Ultimately, however, whether the
forging of policies should be top-down (government-initiated) or bottom-up (industryinitiated), is controversial. Miller observes that "[g]overnments are asking ... industry
to actively lead e-commerce policy development. Leadership, however, flows from clear
purpose and direction, not from dithering." Harris N. Miller, On the Same Page?,
UPSIDE, Apr. 1, 1998, available at 1998 WL 30499950.

20021

EU PRIVACY DIRECTIVE

perception have obvious effects on international relations, as
228
leadership is valued and aggression is resisted and resented.
The question posed by the Directive, then, is whether it reflects a
reasonable amount of international concurrence on privacy-related
values. The answer, unfortunately, is not as simple as the question.
Among hundreds of nations, the dichotomy between the European
Union and the United States stands most dramatically in relief-in
these two culturally-related regions, very basic commonalities 229 are
230
overshadowed by very fundamental differences.
Even the commonality is tenuous.
Admittedly, both the
European Union and the United States consider privacy to be
important.
Yet this statement itself hides two fundamental
differences between the European Union and the United States.
First, the "privacy" considered to be so important in the two places
refers, to some extent, to different conceptions. Every law student in
the United States learns that breach of privacy refers to numerous
differing concepts. It can refer to misappropriation of personality,
invasion of solitude, invasion of autonomy, or misuse of personal
information, for example. The sacred privacies of the European
Union and the United States often refer to very different concepts.
Fundamental European privacy rights are much more sprawling
and all-inclusive, and certainly include data privacy. In the United
States, the kinds of privacy that have been deemed a fundamental

228.
This proposition that aggressive policies are resented when they cross
borders is simply an extension of what one commonly see in other political, economic,
or military arenas.
229.
Kevin Bloss, Note, Raising or Razing the E-Curtain?: The EU Directive on
the Protection of Personal Data, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 645, 646 (2000) (observing
that "the EU and U.S. are not so diametrically opposed in their approaches to privacy
regulation, as one would first assume.").
230.
Jonathan M. Winer, If the U.S. is from Mars and the EU is from Venus,
What Do You Do in Cyberspace?, 1 PRIVACY INFO. L. REP., at 8 (No. 8, 2001).
The divergent approach of the U.S. and the EU to regulating technologies that
inherently do not respect borders has the potential to create a transatlantic
legal labyrinth that can do great harm to global e-commerce. This is obviously
true regarding the EU's approach, as the EU has to date shown little respect
for alternative approaches to their heavily regulatory model. But it also is true
on the U.S. side. Domestic companies exercising First Amendment rights in
the U.S., with permanently established business locations solely limited to the
U.S., operating under contracts that specify the U.S. for choice of law and
choice of jurisdiction, may find themselves nevertheless subject to foreign laws,
jurisdiction, liability and litigation over e-commerce matters. Even worse, in
some cases the interplay between U.S. contract law and requirements of doing
business in the EU may have the potential to create theories of liability for
U.S.-based firms to U.S. persons, if those U.S. persons have an EU nexus to the
transaction. Accordingly, those engaged in e-commerce involving both 'Mars'
and 'Venus' may find their online transactions at some substantial risk from
worlds in collision.
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right tend to be related to autonomy-the right to decide whether to
232
use birth control,2 3 1 for example, or the right to choose an abortion.
The United States simply does not share Europe's extremely high
233
levels of concern about data sharing.
The second difference likely results from, or at the very least
reflects, the first. That is, the European Union and the United States
have adopted fundamentally different legislative and regulatory
approaches to data privacy. Most glaring is the most basic decision
about data privacy, whether to adopt an opt-in approach or an opt-out
approach.
The United States has always embraced an opt-out
approach, presuming that data privacy often is not a serious concern,
while the European Union has adopted an opt-in approach,
presuming that data privacy generally is a serious concern.
The difference may reflect more than competing philosophies
about privacy. In all likelihood, they reflect more fundamental
differences regarding the role of the government in the maintenance
of social order and the importance of minimizing the cost of doing
business. Europe places a relatively high emphasis on government as
23 4
a source of the public good, relative to the United States.
Contemporary U.S. policies have reduced the role of government, in
the faith that unfettered businesses will thrive as costs and
impediments are reduced 235 and that the marketplace will help
resolve social issues that might be addressed by government in
Europe. 236
This juxtaposition translates into a relatively "low
interference/high freedom" culture in the United States, 237 consistent
with weak legal and regulatory data privacy protections.
In light of these observations, the impact of European-style
privacy protections may go well beyond their own specific limits,
representing a more symbolic, all-encompassing faith in government

231.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
232.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
233.
U.S. Government and EU split over Data Protection Directive, NEW MEDIA
AGE, Apr. 5, 2001, at 14, available at 2001 WL 11317678 (calling the U.S. view on data
privacy incompatible with the EU view because the former are "more relaxed" than the
latter).
234.
Charles Kennedy, Comment, European Leaders Should Be More Important
to Us Than the U.S. President,TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 2000, at Features (noting that
"self-help" solutions are more common in the United States, compared with
government solutions to social problems in the United Kingdom).
235.
Redefining the Government, J. COMM., Sept. 4, 1997, at 8A (observing that
U.S. efforts to reduce regulation are decades old).
236.
Peter Grier, In Europe, Bush Tries Easier Tack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 12, 2001, at 1 (contrasting the U.S. and EU approaches to government
intervention in addressing social issues).
237.
Americans Have Adjusted Their Views on Government's Role Within the
Context of Traditional Values: An Interview with Richard B. Wirthlin, PUB.
PERSPECTIVE, Feb.-Mar. 1998, at 25 (containing comments of Richard B. Wirthlin
regarding "[tloday's commitment to less government and more individual
responsibility").
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protections that surpasses what U.S. culture is presently prepared to
accommodate.
As such, the European privacy protections may
demand a fundamental philosophical shift of U.S. values and normsthreatening in itself, but even more so when imposed from without.
2. The Future of the Data Privacy Directive's Outward Reach After

September 11, 2001
In the latter half of the 1990s, when it attempted to forge global
policy through the Data Privacy Directive, the European Union could
not have foreseen the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001238 or
their potential impact on global attitudes toward privacy generally,
and U.S. attitudes toward privacy specifically. Nonetheless, these
events and their aftermath could have an effect on the value that U.S.
citizens place on privacy of all varieties, including data privacy. In
the foreseeable future, the EU Data Privacy Directive's efforts to
establish a global order in the realm of privacy could be further
thwarted by terrorist events.
David Wessel points to September 11 as "a pivot point in
American life," engendering major shifts in values. 239 After concerns
over personal privacy had begun to grow in the United States on the
heels of the Internet's power, September 11 shifted the focus away
from privacy and toward security. 240
It is no surprise that
unprecedented acts of terrorism should affect the cost-benefit
analysis in the balancing of privacy and safety interests.
Surveillance tools used by the military and intelligence branches of
the government are no less potentially invasive to personal freedoms;
yet some may be willing to sacrifice more of those freedoms if they
believe that the payoff will be better government protection against
future atrocities. 241 Indeed, immediately following the attacks, the
U.S. Congress began examining anti-terrorist legislation that evoked
242
concerns about civil liberties in general and privacy in particular.

238.
See Planes Crash into World Trade Center and Pentagon, Possibly Terrorist
Attacks, NPR MORNING EDITION, Sept. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9328799 (giving
an early news report of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001).
239.
David Wessel, Capital:A Pivot Point in American Life, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4,
2001, at Al.
240.
Id.
241.
David Lightman, Americans Want Both Privacy and Security; Terror in
America, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 4, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 25325001

(discussing the privacy-security tradeoff, and suggesting that after September 11, 2001
people may be willing to trade some privacy rights for increased security, but with
limitations).
242.
Greg Miller, Response to Terror, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at A3 (discussing
such proposed legislation).
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If there is a pendulum swing in the United States away from
privacy rights that appear to impede the government's ability to
protect against terrorism, it may widen the existing gap between U.S.
and European privacy values. The question of its effect is a difficult
one to answer, because there are forces acting in two different
directions. On one hand, there are reasons to believe that U.S.
retrenchment from growing privacy rights might not be matched by a
parallel and equal retrenchment in Europe. For one, the terrorist
acts of September 11 occurred in the United States, so it is possible
that the U.S. reaction will be most severe. 24 3 Moreover, since
substantial U.S. recognition of serious data privacy interests is so
recent a phenomenon, it may not have the "legs" of more firmly
entrenched, long-standing European pro-privacy values. Either of
these dynamics could result in rapid U.S. renunciation of data
privacy initiatives, without an analogous move on the part of Europe.
Should this prove to be the case, the gap will grow, and the already
aggressive EU Data Privacy Directive will potentially become more
divisive.
On the other hand, the gulf between U.S. and European
attitudes might remain unaffected by, or even be reduced by, the
September 11 attacks. Since EU and U.S. political interests are
largely aligned in the war against terrorism,24 4 it is possible that the
European Union will move closer to the United States as a result of
the attacks, rather than the United States moving away from the
European Union. To the extent that Europeans feel vulnerable as a
result of terrorism, they may shift their emphasis away from data
2 45
privacy and toward protective anti-terrorist surveillance programs.
Furthermore, since much of Europe confers upon government a
stronger role in protecting the public welfare than has been true of
the post-Reagan era United States, 246 Europe may in some ways be
more receptive, rather than less receptive, to initiatives that
strengthen the government's antiterrorist capabilities. This result

243.
This is only one possibility. Given much of Europe's sympathetic alliance
with the United States following the attacks, such as British Prime Minister Tony
Blair's strong statements aligning the United Kingdom with the United States, it is
possible that the threat is seen as being equally palpable in Europe, and therefore will
have a similar effect on European desire for effective antiterrorist monitoring tools.
244.
Geoff Meade et al., EU Pledges to Join US Response to Terror Attacks,
PRESS Ass'N, Sept. 21, 2001, at Home News (noting a firm backing of European leaders
of "a targeted American response to the terrorist atrocities in Washington and New
York").
245.
Beating Terrorism Will Mean Sacrificing Some Freedoms, EXPRESS
(London), Sept. 20, 2001, at 12 (suggesting that the British must reassess their
priorities in regard to personal freedoms in the wake of the terrorist activities of
September 11, 2001).
246.
Kennedy, supranote 234.
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would reflect a more general emphasis on community welfare2 47 in
some European nations. 248 This theory could be consistent with
Europe's traditional strong pro-privacy stance, especially to the
extent that modern privacy concerns in Europe focus on breaches
initiated by the private sector rather than the public sector.

VI. CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that modern technology has heightened
the world's interest, albeit to varying degrees, in the protection of
data privacy.
The European Union has taken an aggressive
leadership position, and has elected to force the issue as a means of
ensuring that its strong protections not be diluted or destroyed as
soon as data pass beyond EU borders. This policy is but one example
of a broad policy question facing the shrinking globe in the age of the
Internet: how is an ever more integrated world to govern relations in
light of historic limitations of sovereignty?
How question is answered is likely to affect international
relations, and potentially the world, in the twenty-first century and
beyond. The terrorist tragedies of September 11, 2001 certainly force
the question to the world's immediate attention. The future success
of the EU Data Privacy Directive could serve as an important proving
ground for a position of aggressive regional leadership. But success is
by no means guaranteed. Meanwhile, the fate of the Directive plays a
critical symbolic role in the tension between coercion and colloquy in
the future forging of global policy.

247.
For detailed discussion of community in global capitalist markets, see Don
Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 215
(2001).
248.
Some Western European cultures, such as Germany, tend to embrace a
more communitarian and less individualistic ethics than one sees in places like the
United States. Timothy L. Fort & Cindy Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global
Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829,
832 (2000) (discussing this distinction in terms of communitarian and contractarian
models of corporate governance).

